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R eflec ting  upon the state of the art of m acroeconom ics in the 
n ineteen  seventies, R obert G ordon  (1981) com pared it to an elec- 
tion  betw een two unattractive  candidates: the New Classical M a­
croeconom ics versus the N on-M arket-C learing Paradigm . This 
book shows th a t the n ineteen eighties o ffer m ore th an  two (per- 
haps less unattractive) candita tes to choose from . I t com prises 
the papers, com m ents, and related  discussions of a conference on 
the dynam ics of decentralized m arket econom ies held in 1983. 
A ccord ing  to the editors’ in troducto ry  paper (C hap ter 1), a reason 
fo r organizing  this conference was to b ring  together various 
strands of research  related  to the understanding  of econom ic 
dynam ics. H ence the book contains a diversity  of methods, 
models, and ideas. H ow ever, it is doubtful w hether all of them  fit 
in to  the fram ew ork  R ichard  D ay and G u n n ar E liasson describe 
in  C hap ter 1; especially w ith  respect to th e ir claim  th a t "econo­
mic activ ity  is conducted by boundedly ra tiona l agents"1 (p. 11). 
T he rest of the book is divided in to  th ree  parts reflecting  the 
papers’ m ajor points of em phasis. P art I deals w ith "Theory and 
M odels of D ynam ic E conom ic Systems", P art I I  focuses upon 
"Technology and Innovation", and the  papers of P art I I I  are con- 
cerned w ith "Institutions and Markets". In  the follow ing I shall 
no t deal w ith all of the eighteen papers and notes, ra th e r I shall 
focus upon some of them  and m ention  the subjects of a couple 
of others. Of course, this only reflects my own taste fo r d ifferen t 
strategies of m odelling econom ic dynam ics.
P a rt I opens w ith H erb ert Sim on’s paper "On the Behavioral 
and R ational Foundations of Econom ic Dynamics". H e argues 
th a t bo th  the New Classical and the N on-M arket-C learing 
M odels explain  the stylized facts of the business cycle by im- 
posing a rb itra ry  bounds upon the  ra tionality  of agents. These 
bounds, however, have no sound em pirical base. Thus, Simon 
pleads fo r grounding econom ic models on decision rules verified 
in em pirical research of the decision processes of individuals and
Roughly described, bounded rationality means that agents act according to rules of 
thumb and not according to the maximization framework.
firms. H e recom m ends cognitive psychology as a theoretical 
fram ew ork  fo r guiding this research.
In  his paper "D isequilibrium  E conom ic D ynam ics: A  Post 
Schum peterian  C ontribution" R ichard  D ay questions Schumpe- 
te r’s hypothesis th a t p ioneering en trep reneurs p reven t an  econo- 
my from  settling dow n in a stationary  equilibrium . H e argues 
th a t optim um  seeking behavior of boundedly ra tiona l agents, 
nonlinearities, and regim e sw itching due to  co n stra in ts  from  ex- 
haustible resources render econom ic dynam ics locally unstable. 
On the assum ption tha t econom ic processes are even globally un­
stable, he reverses the  role of Schum peter’s en trepreneur: now his 
task is to devise structura l changes necessary fo r preventing 
econom ic systems from  collapse.
D ay’s guess about the stability  p roperties of econom ic systems 
contrasts sharply  w ith the paper by R o b ert C low er and Daniel 
Friedm an. T hey establish  local stab ility  fo r a general equilibrium  
type m onetary  exchange econom y w here trade specialists, hold- 
ing inventories to accom m odate transactions at non-m arket-clear- 
ing prices, change prices in response to observed inven to ry  im- 
balances and excess dem and. It m ay be no tew orthy  in this re- 
spect th a t there  is an o th er recen t stab ility  result. F ran k lin  Fisher 
(1983) proved convergence fo r a general equilib rium  m odel with 
price setting agents under an  assum ption precluding  the sudden 
appearance of previously unrecognized p ro fitab le  opportunities. 
Essentially, this assum ption banishes Schum peterian  en trep re­
neurs from  the stage.
O n the  o ther hand, Day shows in  his no te  "On Endogeneous 
P references and A daptive Econom izing" th a t a stable price ad- 
justm ent process of the C low er-Friedm an type m ight give rise to 
cyclical or even erra tic  dynam ics w hen m erged w ith  a (by itself 
also stable, i.e., hab it form ing) process of p re ference  form ation.
G unnar E liasson’s paper "M icro H eterogen ity  of F irm s and 
the S tability of Industria l G row th" reports on Sim ulation experi- 
m ents perform ed w ith the m icro-m acro m odel developed at the 
Industrial In stitu te  of E conom ic and Social R esearch  in  Stock­
holm. T he core of this m odel is a population  of firm s, each of 
them  acting according to decision rules confirm ed  by observa- 
tion of real Swedish firm s. T he firm s’ investm ent decisions 
transform  the exogenously grow ing technological po ten tia l into 
actual p roductiv ity  grow th. These decisions are governed by the 
difference betw een a firm ’s nom inal ra te  of re tu rn  on capital and 
the m arket in terest rate. A n  exogenously given m arke t regime
determ ines how  fast in terfirm  d ifferences in the re tu rn  on Capi­
tal are com peted away. T he results show  th a t fast adjustm ent in 
Capital, labour, and product m arkets decreases these d ifferences 
and m oves actual p roduction  closer to  the tran sfo rm atio n  curve. 
D uring  the firs t half of the run the fast m arke t regim e exhibits 
the greatest g row th in aggregate output; th en  the steady grow th 
suddenly breaks down. Hence, there  seems to be an  in h eren t con- 
flic t betw een stable m acroeconom ic grow th and sh o rt term  ef- 
ficiency. H ow ever, since the paper does n o t elaborate  the model- 
ling of the ad justm ent processes it rem ains obscure how  this con- 
flic t is endogenously created. O f course, this shortcom ing  is due 
to  the fac t th a t a m odel being the result of m any years of w ork 
canno t be trea ted  extensively w ith in  a sho rt paper. T he problem  
w ith  this k ind  of w ork is th a t unless the reader is no t w illing to 
read  a considerable num ber of papers dealing w ith  the m odel he 
is left ra th e r w ith  im pressions th an  w ith insights.
A n  IS-LM -type aggregate dem and function , m arke t Clearing 
prices on the  aggregate product m arket, a Phillips curve like 
wage adjustm ent, and adaptive expectations as to  fu tu re  dem and 
are the  basic ingredien ts of Jean-Pascal Benassy’s "Non-W alras- 
ian  M odel of the Business Cycle". A ssum ing a strong  reaction  of 
investm ent dem and on expected sales, he is able to  prove the 
existence of a lim it cycle.
A n o th e r m ethod of m odelling econom ic dynam ics is pre- 
sented in P a rt II  by Sidney W inter. H e extends the  m odel of 
N elson and W in ter (1982) by allow ing fo r firm  entry . C hoosing 
app ro p ria te  sets of param eter values, his sim ulations give rise to 
tw o d iffe ren t stories of industry  evolution. T he ’en trep reneuria l’ 
regim e assigns h igher p robabilities of m aking successful innova- 
tions to  po ten tia l m arket en tran ts, w hereas the ’rou tin ized’ 
regim e sh ifts innovative luck tow ards established firm s. Con- 
sequently, industry  evolution w ith in  the en trep ren eu ria l regim e 
exhibits m ore dynam ics in term s of firm  exit and en try  than  
does evolution w ith in  the rou tin ized regime, featu ring  a small 
num ber of long living firm s. F o r those readers w ho are not 
fam iliar w ith  the  N elson-W inter-m odel I should like to  add tha t 
this m odel is a M arkov m odel of industry  evolution in  w hich 
prespecified  rules govern firm s investm ent and R& D policies. 
E ach  period’s m arket price is (anonym ously) determ ined so as to 
equate dem and and supply.
U sing a profit-m axim izing fram ew ork, Thom as von U ng ern ­
S ternberg  explores the im pact of p a ten t du ra tion  upon the allo­
cation of (a given am ount of) expenditures betw een innovative 
and im itative R&D. In  a concluding note to  P a rt II  Ove G ran ­
strand  describes the characteristics of new, innovation  based 
firm s in the Swedish industry  a fte r W orld W ar II  and discusses 
aspects of the m odelling of firm  en try  in  m odels like the  ones of 
E liasson and W inter.
T he papers of P art III  are no t concerned w ith d iffe ren t strat- 
egies of m odelling econom ic dynam ics but focus upon theoretical 
or em pirical issues related  to the in terp lay  betw een institu tional 
and econom ic change. F o r instance, C arl C hristian  von Weiz- 
säcker’s paper deals w ith the role p roperty  rights and ’relations’ 
(such as custom er loyality) play in econom ic developm ent; Tad 
R ybczynski describes the way ex ternal finance  is provided to 
firm s in the U.S., Europe, and Japan; D ean S pinanger’s paper ad- 
vocates the hypothesis th a t w elfare policies and labor unions 
have in terfered  w ith the effic ien t function ing  of labor m arkets.
A t a firs t glance this book m ight convey the im pression of a 
sharp  con trast in explanatory  pow er and richness of structure 
betw een the highly abstract general equilibrium  m odels and the 
models of econom ic evolution based upon the actions of bound- 
edly ra tional agents. H ence one rem ark  m ay be perm itted. Think- 
ing in term s of (biological) evolu tionary  theo ry  we m ust dis- 
tinguish the process of adaption  to a given env ironm en t from  
the process th a t changes this very environm ent. Since optim iza- 
tion requires a set of prespecified constrain ts, i.e., a given en­
v ironm ent, it is an  adequate fram ew ork  fo r studying adaptation  
processes. By the very natu re  of this fram ew ork , how ever, the 
optim izing agent cannot change the constra in ts his actions de- 
pend upon. Yet, I doubt w hether the boundedly ra tio n a l agent 
can change them. H ence, it always requires a Schum peterian  en- 
trep reneur or a sim ilar device to push an  econom ic system  from  
one evolutionary  state to the other. Since in such m odels the en­
v ironm ent rapidly changes, it m ay be app ro p ria te  (at least for 
reasons of analytic trac tab ility ) to m odel agents’ behav io r by pre­
specified rules slowly adapting to the changing environm ent. 
T h erefo r we should th ink  ra th e r in term s of d iffe ren t questions 
requiring d iffe ren t m ethods th an  in term s of m utually  exclusive 
paradigm s.
In  any case, the book stim ulates discussion w ith  respect to the 
adaquate m odelling of econom ic dynam ics, and it brings to the 
foreground a variety  of institu tional issues related  to  the  devel­
opm ent of m arket economies. H ence, everyone dealing w ith  eco­
nom ic dynam ics and econom ic developm ent should have a look 
at it.
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